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Abstract
This paper considers the problem of filter design with secrecy constraints, where two legitimate parties
(Alice and Bob) communicate in the presence of an eavesdropper (Eve), over a Gaussian multiple-input-
multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channel. This problem involves designing, subject to a power constraint,
the transmit and the receive filters which minimize the mean-squared error (MSE) between the legitimate
parties whilst assuring that the eavesdropper MSE remains above a certain threshold. We consider a
general MIMO Gaussian wiretap scenario, where the legitimate receiver uses a linear Zero-Forcing (ZF)
filter and the eavesdropper receiver uses either a ZF or an optimal linear Wiener filter. We provide a
characterization of the optimal filter designs by demonstrating the convexity of the optimization problems.
We also provide generalizations of the filter designs from the scenario where the channel state is known
to all the parties to the scenario where there is uncertainty in the channel state. A set of numerical results
illustrates the performance of the novel filter designs, including the robustness to channel modeling errors.
In particular, we assess the efficacy of the designs in guaranteeing not only a certain MSE level at the
eavesdropper, but also in limiting the error probability at the eavesdropper. We also assess the impact of
the filter designs on the achievable secrecy rates. The penalty induced by the fact that the eavesdropper
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2may use the optimal non-linear receive filter rather than the optimal linear one is also explored in the
paper.
Index Terms
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mation, Error Probability
I. INTRODUCTION
The issues of privacy and security in wireless communication networks have taken on an increasingly
important role as these networks continue to flourish worldwide. Traditionally, security is viewed as an
independent feature with little or no relation to the remaining data communication tasks and, therefore,
state-of-the-art cryptographic algorithms are insensitive to the physical nature of the wireless medium.
However, there has been more recently a renewed interest on physical-layer security which, motivated
by advances on information-theoretic security, calls for the use of physical-layer techniques exploiting the
inherent randomness of the communications medium to guarantee both reliable communication between
two legitimate parties as well as secure communication in the presence of eavesdroppers.
The basis of information-theoretic security, which builds upon Shannon’s notion of perfect secrecy [1],
was laid by Wyner [2] and by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [3] who proved in seminal papers that there exist channel
codes guaranteeing both robustness to transmission errors and a certain degree of data confidentiality.
In particular, Wyner considered the wiretap channel where two legitimate users communicate in the
presence of an eavesdropper. Wyner characterized the rate-equivocation region of the wiretap channel
and its secrecy capacity. Ever since, the computation of the secrecy capacity of a range of communications
channels has been an important research topic [4].
For example, in [5] the authors considered a scenario where both the main and the eavesdropper
channels are additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels. They showed that the secrecy capacity of
such so-called Gaussian wiretap channel is equal to the difference between the main and the eavesdropper
channel capacities and, therefore, confidential communications require the Gaussian main channel to have
a better signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) than the Gaussian eavesdropper channel.
Motivated by the emerging wireless applications, the evaluation of the secrecy capacity of wireless
fading channels with single or multiple antennas at the transmitters, receivers and/or eavesdroppers has
also attracted considerable attention as well.
Space-time signal processing techniques for secure communications over wireless links were introduced
in [6]. The outage secrecy capacity of slow fading channels was characterized in [7], where it was shown
3that fading alone could guarantee information-theoretic security, even when the eavesdropper average
SNR is higher that the legitimate receiver average SNR. In turn, the ergodic secrecy capacity of fading
channels was independently characterized in [8], [9] and [10]. In [11] Parada and Blahut considered
the secrecy capacity of several degraded fading channels. The characterization of the secrecy capacity of
multiple-input-multiple-output (MIMO) channels, which represent a model for multiple-antenna channels,
can be found in [12], [13], [14] and [15]. The computation of optimal power allocation policies and
input covariances for the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel are covered in [16] and [17], respectively.
Another key aspect in the MIMO wiretap problem is the availability of channel state information (CSI).
This problem is addressed in various works under different CSI assumptions. When the CSI about the
various channels is assumed to be known to all the parties, several secrecy capacity achieving schemes,
based on optimal beamforming designs that leverage the general singular value decomposition (GSVD)
of the main and eavesdropper channel matrices, have been proposed (e.g. [15] and [18]). When the CSI
about the eavesdropper channel is assumed to be limited or not available, artificial noise schemes have
been proposed instead [19], [20], where a fraction of the total power is used for reliable communication
between the legitimate transmitter and the legitimate receiver and the remaining fraction of the total
power is used to jam the eavesdropper. For example, the authors in [21] and [22], set up a problem
whose objective is to determine the minimum transmit power necessary to guarantee a certain quality of
service (QoS) between the legitimate transmitter and the legitimate receiver – the remaining power out
of the total power budget is then used to jam the eavesdropper using artificial noise type of techniques.
One key advantage of artificial noise transmission relates to the fact that the eavesdropper channel
knowledge is not required. Nonetheless, the idea of transmitting artificial noise in the null space of the
main channel in order to degrade the eavesdropper channel has also its limitations. On the one hand, there
is an inherent trade-off between data rate and the ability to impair the eavesdropper [19], so that one may
not take full advantage of the spatial multiplexing ability of MIMO systems. On the other hand, if the
null space of the main channel overlaps considerably with the null space of the eavesdropper channel,
the artificial noise approach might lead to limited gains in security.
This paper, at the heart of the novelty of the contribution, addresses the physical-layer security
problem from the estimation-theoretic rather than the information-theoretic viewpoint. We consider the
problem of filter design with secrecy constraints in the classical MIMO wiretap scenario consisting of
two legitimate parties that communicate in the presence of an eavesdropper, where the objective is to
conceive transmit and receive filters that, subject to a power constraint, minimize the mean-squared
error (MSE) between the legitimate parties whilst assuring that the eavesdropper MSE remains above
4a certain threshold. Interestingly, this class of problems, which differs from previous approaches in
physical-layer security in the literature (see, e.g., [15], [18], [19], [21] and [22]), represents a natural
generalization of filter design without secrecy constraints for point-to-point communications systems
(e.g., [23], [24], [25], [26], [27], [28]).
One notable merit of this approach, in contrast to the information-theoretic work that relies on non-
constructive random-coding arguments to demonstrate that there exist secrecy capacity achieving codes,
is that it leads to realizable designs which can be easily implemented in practical systems. Instead,
practical secrecy capacity achieving code designs are known only in some scenarios, which include: i)
the main channel is noiseless and the eavesdropper channel is a binary erasure channel [29], [30]; ii)
both channels are binary input symmetric discrete memoryless channels (DMC) and the eavesdropper
channel is degraded with respect to the main channel – where polar codes are used [31], [32]; and iii)
the eavesdropper is constrained combinatorially [33].
Nonetheless, it is relevant to pause to reflect on the operational relevance of this new metric, in view
of the fact that it is the norm, in the information-theoretic security literature, to use equivocation rather
than MSE to measure security. In fact, the use of the MSE in lieu of equivocation does not guarantee
perfect information-theoretic security in the sense of [1], [2] and [3]. We view the design of the filters
based on the MSE criteria as a means to provide additional confusion in a communications system.
The rationale of the new design approach is then based on the fact that some applications require a MSE
below a certain level to function properly, so that this approach would impair further the performance of
the eavesdropper by imposing a threshold on its MSE level. Note also that the bit error rate (BER), which
is a very important figure of merit in a communications system, is typically monotonically increasing
with the MSE, so that a threshold on the MSE may also translate into a threshold in the BER.
One particular scenario that suits this design approach relates to wireless broadcasting where a ser-
vice provider provides different services, e.g. different video streams, to different users/subscribers (see
Figure 1). Here, the service provider (the legitimate transmitter) needs to guarantee that a user that has
subscribed to the service (the legitimate receiver) has access to a high quality version of the video stream
whereas a user that has not subscribed to the service (the so-called eavesdropper) has only access to
a very poor quality version of the video stream. The use of a distortion metric, such as the MSE or
the BER, instead of equivocation, is then entirely appropriate for this class of applications, offering an
alternative to the cryptographic methods used by Content Access (CA) systems [34], [35], [36].
It turns out thus that the filter design with secrecy constraints problem is to be understood broadly
as a filter design problem with distortion constraints. However, in order to connect this work with the
5large body of work of physical- and information-theoretic security whose overarching aim is to impair
the eavesdropper, we – in a somewhat abusive use of language – use the notion secrecy rather than
distortion.
This paper is structured as follows: Section II defines the problem. Section III considers the design
of the transmit filter when ZF filters are used at both the legitimate and the eavesdropper receivers. In
turn, Section IV considers the design of the transmit filter when the eavesdropper uses an optimal linear
filter while the legitimate receiver is restricted to the use of a ZF receive filter. Section V provides some
generalizations of the problem of filter design with secrecy constraints, from the scenario where the state
of the channels is known exactly to all the parties (i.e., the legitimate transmitter, the legitimate receiver
and the eavesdropper) to the scenario where there is uncertainty in the channel state. Section VI shows
various numerical results to illustrate the impact of the filter designs on both the reliability and security
criteria, evaluating, not only the MSE, but also the bit error rate and the achievable secrecy rates yielded
by the designs. The main contributions of the manuscript are summarized in Section VII.
A. Notation
We use the following notation: boldface upper-case letters denote matrices or column vectors (X) and
italics denote scalars (x); the context defines whether the quantities are deterministic or random. The
notation M  0 is used to denote a positive definite matrix and M  0 denotes a positive semidefinite
matrix. The symbol I represents the identity matrix. The operators ‖ · ‖2, tr {·} and ∇ represent the
l2-norm, the trace operator and the gradient operator, respectively. The operators (·)† and (·)+ denote the
Hermitian transpose operator and the Pseudo-Inverse operator, respectively. The operator E (·) represents
the expectation. CN (µ,Σ) denotes a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random vector with mean
µ and covariance Σ.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider a communications scenario where a legitimate user, say Alice, communicates with another
legitimate user, say Bob, in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve (see Figure 2).
Bob and Eve observe the output of the MIMO channels given, respectively, by:
YM = HMHTX + NM (1)
YE = HEHTX + NE (2)
6where YM ∈ CnM and YE ∈ CnE are the vectors of receive symbols, X ∈ Cm is the vector of
independent, zero-mean and unit-variance transmit symbols, and NM ∈ CnM and NE ∈ CnE are
circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random vector with zero mean and identity covariance matrix1.
The nM ×m matrix HM and the nE ×m matrix HE contain the deterministic gains from each main
and eavesdropper channel input to each main and eavesdropper channel output, respectively. The m×m
matrix HT represents Alice’s transmit filter.
We assume that HMHT and HEHT are full column rank, which implies that nM ≥ m and nE ≥ m.
This is necessary to guarantee the existence of some solutions. We further assume that, in a realistic
scenario, the channel matrices HM and HE are not a multiple of each other. We also assume that
the channel state is known by all the parties, i.e. Alice, Bob and Eve have perfect knowledge about
the channel matrices HM and HE . This is often a common assumption in the physical layer security
literature (see e.g. [7] and [38]). The assumption that the legitimate receiver knows the state of the main
channel and the eavesdropper receiver knows the state of the wiretap channel is realistic, because the
receivers can always estimate the channels in slow fading conditions. The assumption that the transmitter
knows the state of the main channel and, more importantly, the wiretap channel or that the legitimate
receiver knows the state of the wiretap channel and the eavesdropper knows the state of the main channel
can be justified in wireless networks where the eavesdropper is another network active user (e.g. in the
scenario of Figure 1). In particular, in time division duplex (TDD) environments Alice can estimate the
state of Bob’s and Eve’s channels and inform the receivers accordingly. However, we will also generalize
the framework to incorporate possible channel uncertainties in the sequel.
Bob’s and Eve’s estimate of the vector of input symbols are, respectively, given by:
XˆM = HRMYM (3)
XˆE = HREYE (4)
where the m×nM matrix HRM and the m×nE matrix HRE represent Bob’s and Eve’s receive filters,
respectively.
In this setting, we take, as a performance metric, the MSE between the estimate of the input vector
1The models in (1) and in (2) follow from the more general models Y˜M = H˜MHTX + N˜M and Y˜E = H˜EHTX + N˜E , respectively,
where N˜M and N˜E are circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random vectors with mean E
(
N˜M
)
= 0 and E
(
N˜E
)
= 0, and
covariance matrices E
(
N˜M N˜
†
M
)
= ΣNM and E
(
N˜EN˜
†
E
)
= ΣNE , respectively, by using pre-whitening filters i.e., YM = Σ
−1/2
NM
Y˜M
= Σ
−1/2
NM
H˜MHTX + Σ
−1/2
NM
N˜M = HMHTX + NM and YE = HEHTX + NE . These transformations are information lossless [37].
7Xˆ and the true input vector X given by:
MSE = E
[
‖X− Xˆ‖2
]
(5)
The objective is to design, for specific receive filter choices, the transmit filter that solves the opti-
mization problem:
minMSEM = E
[
‖X− XˆM‖2
]
(6)
subject to the security constraint:
MSEE = E
[
‖X− XˆE‖2
]
≥ γ (7)
where γ represents an MSE threshold, and to the total power constraint:
tr
{
HTH
†
T
}
≤ Pavg (8)
where Pavg represents the available power.
We restrict our attention to two specific design scenarios: i) the situation where both the legitimate
receiver and the eavesdropper receiver are constrained to obey ZF constraints; and ii) the situation where
the legitimate receiver uses a ZF filter whereas the eavesdropper receiver uses the optimal linear Wiener
filter. For these receiver filter choices, the optimization problem in (6) – (8) is convex thus enabling the
characterization of optimal designs; for other receiver filter choices, and to the best of our knowledge,
the optimization problem in (6) – (8) is only convex for special scenarios, e.g. the degraded parallel
Gaussian wiretap channel, or the degraded MIMO wiretap channel (see [39] and [40])2.
We recognize that our formulation assumes the so-called eavesdropper to perform a certain linear
action whereas the traditional information-theoretic formulation – in view of the fact that it is based on
the equivocation metric – does not assume the eavesdropper to perform any specific operation. However,
in the scenario where the eavesdropper is another user of the network as in Figure 1, it seems appropriate
to assume a certain action by this user. We also recognize the fact that a more sophisticated eavesdropper
would possibly leverage nonlinear techniques to estimate the information. This issue is also discussed in
the sequel.
2We prove the convexity of the filter design with secrecy constraints optimization problem by using the change of variables Z =
(
HTH
†
T
)−1
.
This change of variables leads to convex objective functions as well as convex feasible regions when both the legitimate receiver and the
eavesdropper receiver use ZF filters (see (17), (18) and (19)) and when the legitimate receiver uses a ZF filter but the eavesdropper receiver
uses a Wiener filter (see (43), (44) and (45)). However, such a change of variables does not lead immediately to a convex optimization problem
when both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper receiver adopt the Wiener filter (the feasible region is still convex but the objective
function is concave rather than convex). Thus – with the exception of [39] and [40] – it is not entirely clear whether other change of variables
lead to a convex optimization problem in such a case.
8It is also important to note that, and in contrast to the artificial noise approach in [19], [20], [21], [22]
and [41], our filter design approach does not impose a limitation on the ability of transmitting information
along all the dimensions that the MIMO channel has to offer and, therefore, we can expect to achieve
higher data rates. However, by imposing a threshold on the eavesdropper MSE we may also naturally
constraint the performance of the main channel.
III. ZERO FORCING FILTERS AT THE RECEIVERS
We now consider the scenario where both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper receiver use
ZF filters, thus obeying the ZF constraints given by:
HRMHMHT = I (9)
HREHEHT = I (10)
The rationale for including the ZF constraints in (9) and (10) is to eliminate crosstalk between the various
streams (e.g. [42]). Note also that the performance of ZF linear receivers is equivalent to that of optimal
Wiener linear receivers in the regime of high SNR. Yet, one may still argue that a eavesdropper will
always adopt the optimal linear receive filter (or the optimal non-linear receive filter), rather than the
sub-optimal ZF receive filter. These particular cases will be addressed in Sections IV and VII.
A. Optimal Receive Filters
Let us consider the design of the receive filters. Bob uses the receive filter that, for any fixed transmit
filter HT , minimizes:
MSEM = E
[
‖X− XˆM‖2
]
= E [‖X−HRMYM‖2] (11)
subject to the ZF constraint in (9) and Eve uses the receive filter that, for any fixed transmit filter HT ,
minimizes:
MSEE = E
[
‖X− XˆE‖2
]
= E [‖X−HREYE‖2] (12)
subject to the ZF constraint in (10).
In particular, the receive filters, which follow immediately from (9) and (10), are given by [37]:
H∗RM = (HMHT )
+ =
(
H†TH
†
MHMHT
)−1
H†TH
†
M (13)
H∗RE = (HEHT )
+ =
(
H†TH
†
EHEHT
)−1
H†TH
†
E (14)
9The MSEs in the main and eavesdropper channels, upon substituting (13) and (14) in (11) and (12),
respectively, are then given by:
MSEM = E
[‖X−H∗RMYM‖2] = tr{(H†TH†MHMHT)−1} (15)
MSEE = E
[‖X−H∗REYE‖2] = tr{(H†TH†EHEHT)−1} (16)
B. Optimal Transmit Filter
In view of (15) and (16), the form of the optimal transmit filter corresponds to the solution of the
optimization problem:
min
HT
tr
{(
H†TH
†
MHMHT
)−1}
(17)
subject to the constraints:
tr
{(
H†TH
†
EHEHT
)−1} ≥ γ (18)
tr
{
HTH
†
T
}
≤ Pavg (19)
and HTH
†
T  0 (Note that HTH†T  0, because HMHT and HEHT are full column rank by
assumption). Note that – due to the channel knowledge assumptions – the legitimate transmitter, the
legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper can all set up this optimization problem in order to determine
the transmit filter and hence the receive filters via (13) and (14).
It is now possible to reduce this optimization problem to a standard convex optimization problem by
adopting the change of variables Z =
(
HTH
†
T
)−1
, thereby paving the way to the characterization of
the optimal transmit filter.
The following Theorem, which stems directly from the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions [43],
defines the form of the optimal transmit filter.
Theorem 1: Assume that the legitimate transmitter, the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper know
the exact channel matrices HM and HE . Assume also that the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper
receiver use ZF filters. Then, an optimal transmit filter that solves the optimization problem in (17) –
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(19) is, without loss of generality, given by:
H∗T =

√
Pavg
tr
{
(H†MHM)
− 1
2
} (H†MHM)− 14 ,
tr
{
(H†MHM)
− 1
2
}
Pavg
tr
{(
H†EHE
)−1 (
H†MHM
) 1
2
}
> γ
√
Pavg
tr
{[
[H†MHM ]
−1−ν[H†EHE]
−1] 12}
[[
H†MHM
]−1 − ν [H†EHE]−1] 14 ,
tr
{
(H†MHM)
− 1
2
}
Pavg
tr
{(
H†EHE
)−1 (
H†MHM
) 1
2
}
≤ γ
where the value of the Lagrange multiplier ν is such that:
tr
{(
H†EHE
)−1((
H†MHM
)−1 − ν (H†EHE)−1)−1/2
}
×
× tr
{((
H†MHM
)−1 − ν (H†EHE)−1)1/2
}
= γ · Pavg (20)
Note that the right multiplication of the transmit filter in Theorem 1 by any unitary matrix produces
another optimal filter.
Proof: By considering the change of variables Z =
(
HTH
†
T
)−1
it is possible to rewrite the
optimization problem in (17) – (19) as follows:
min
Z
tr
{(
H†MHM
)−1
Z
}
(21)
subject to the constraints tr
{(
H†EHE
)−1
Z
}
≥ γ, tr {Z−1} ≤ Pavg, and Z  0. Note that this
represents a standard convex optimization problem, so that the solution follows directly from the Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions [43].
The Lagrangian of the optimization problem is given by:
L (Z, ν, µ)= tr
{(
H†MHM
)−1
Z
}
+ ν
(
γ − tr
{(
H†EHE
)−1
Z
})
+ µ
(
tr
{
Z−1
}− Pavg) (22)
where ν and µ are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the problem constraints. The Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker optimality conditions are given by:
∇ZL (Z, ν, µ) =
(
H†MHM
)−1 − ν (H†EHE)−1 − µZ−2 = 0 (23)
11
ν
[
tr
{(
H†EHE
)−1
Z
}
− γ
]
= 0, ν ≥ 0 (24)
µ
[
Pavg − tr
{
Z−1
}]
= 0, µ ≥ 0 (25)
and Z  0, tr
{(
H†EHE
)−1
Z
}
≥ γ, tr {Z−1} ≤ Pavg.
The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions reveal that the solution of this problem exhibits two
distinct regimes only: i) the regime where the secrecy constraint is not active (ν = 0); and ii) the regime
where the secrecy constraint is met with equality (ν > 0)3.
When ν = 0, then (23) reduces to: (
H†MHM
)−1 − µZ−2 = 0 (26)
and the optimal solution is given by:
Z∗ =
tr
{(
H†MHM
)−1/2}
Pavg
(
H†MHM
)1/2
(27)
This solution is valid if and only if:
tr
{(
H†MHM
)−1/2}
Pavg
tr
{(
H†EHE
)−1 (
H†MHM
)1/2}
> γ (28)
On the other hand, when ν > 0, then (23) reduces to:(
H†MHM
)−1 − ν (H†EHE)−1 − µZ−2 = 0 (29)
and the optimal solution is given by:
Z∗ =
tr
{[(
H†MHM
)−1 − ν (H†EHE)−1] 12
}
Pavg
[(
H†MHM
)−1 − ν (H†EHE)−1]− 12 (30)
This solution is valid if and only if:
tr
{(
H†MHM
)−1/2}
Pavg
tr
{(
H†EHE
)−1 (
H†MHM
)1/2} ≤ γ (31)
3In each case the power constraint is met with equality i.e., µ > 0. Note that a scenario where the µ = 0 would require either the channel
matrices to be a multiple of each other (ν > 0 and µ = 0), or H†MHM = 0 (ν = 0 and µ = 0).
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Note that the optimal transmit filter obeys a simple operational interpretation. In the regime where the
secrecy constraint is inactive, i.e.:
tr
{(
H†MHM
)−1/2}
Pavg
tr
{(
H†EHE
)−1 (
H†MHM
)1/2}
> γ (32)
which typically occurs for low available powers, the filter performs two simple operations: i) conversion of
the main channel (i.e. H†MHM ) into a set of parallel independent channels whose power gains correspond
to the eigenvalues of the matrix H†MHM ; and ii) power allocation, by dividing the total power inversely
proportionally to the power gains of the set of parallel channels. This solution corresponds to the solution
in [37].
In contrast, in the regime where the secrecy constraint is active, i.e.:
tr
{(
H†MHM
)−1/2}
Pavg
tr
{(
H†EHE
)−1 (
H†MHM
)1/2} ≤ γ (33)
which typically occurs for high available powers, the filter can be seen to perform the operations: i)
conversion of an equivalent channel (i.e.
(
H†MHM
)−1−ν (H†EHE)−1) into a set of parallel independent
channels whose power gains correspond to the eigenvalues of the matrix
(
H†MHM
)−1− ν (H†EHE)−1
and; ii) power allocation, by dividing the total power inversely proportionally to the power gains of the
set of parallel channels. This result, which is based on the equivalent channels (rather than on the main
channel), immediately generalizes the result in [37].
Note also that, in the scenario where both receivers use ZF filters the power constraint is always active,
i.e. the transmitter uses all the available power. We will observe in the sequel that this is not the case in
other scenarios.
C. Computational Procedure
The computation of the optimal transmit filter embodied in Theorem 1 requires finding the solution of
the non-linear equation in (20), in order to determine the value of the Lagrange multiplier ν. We shall
now put forth a simpler procedure to design the optimal transmit filter and hence the receive filters via
(13) and (14), based on the dual of the optimization problem.
Consider again the Lagrangian of the optimization problem in (22). Consider also the dual function of
the optimization problem in (21):
L (ν, µ)= inf
Z0
L (Z, ν, µ) (34)
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where ν ≥ 0 and µ ≥ 0. It is straightforward to show that the dual function reduces to:
L (ν, µ) =

2
√
µ tr
{((
H†MHM
)−1 − ν (H†EHE)−1) 12
}
− µPavg + νγ,((
H†MHM
)−1 − ν (H†EHE)−1) ≥ 0
−∞, otherwise
The dual problem of the optimization problem in (21) is now given by:
max
µ,ν
2
√
µ tr
{((
H†MHM
)−1 − ν (H†EHE)−1) 12
}
− µPavg + νγ (35)
subject to ν ≥ 0, µ ≥ 0 and
((
H†MHM
)−1 − ν (H†EHE)−1)  0. We can now employ a two step
procedure to express the solution of this optimization problem: i) optimization over µ for a fixed ν; ii)
optimization over ν for the optimal µ. It is straightforward to show that the optimal value of µ, for a
fixed ν, is given by:
µ =
1
Pavg
2
(
tr
{((
H†MHM
)−1 − ν (H†EHE)−1) 12
})2
(36)
Consequently, the dual optimization problem reduces to:
max
ν
1
Pavg
(
tr
{((
H†MHM
)−1 − ν (H†EHE)−1) 12
})2
+ νγ (37)
subject to ν ≥ 0 and
((
H†MHM
)−1 − ν (H†EHE)−1)  0 or, equivalently:
max
ν
1
Pavg
(
tr
{((
H†MHM
)−1 − ν (H†EHE)−1) 12
})2
+ νγ (38)
subject to:
0 ≤ ν ≤ λmin
((
H†EHE
) 1
2
(
H†MHM
)−1 (
H†EHE
) 1
2
)
(39)
This is due to the fact that the positive semidefinite constraint
((
H†MHM
)−1 − ν (H†EHE)−1)  0
is equivalent to the constraint ν ≤ λmin
((
H†EHE
) 1
2
(
H†MHM
)−1 (
H†EHE
) 1
2
)
, where λmin (M)
denotes the minimum eigenvalue of the positive definite matrix M. The solution to the optimization
problem (38) – (39) can be computed in a straightforward manner using, for example, the bisection
method [44], which represents a much simpler procedure than any method that solves the non-linear
equation in (20).
The optimal values of µ in (36) and ν, which corresponds to the solution of (38) subject to (39) then
define the optimal transmit filter. In turn, the optimal transmit filter defines the ZF receive filters through
(13) and (14).
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IV. OPTIMAL LINEAR RECEIVE FILTER AT THE EAVESDROPPER
We now consider the scenario where the legitimate receiver uses a ZF filter, whilst the eavesdropper
receiver uses the optimal linear Wiener filter. This corresponds to a generalization of the previous scenario
where both the receivers are restricted to obey ZF constraints.
A. Optimal Linear Receive Filter Design
Let us consider the design of the eavesdropper optimal linear receive filter. Eve now uses the receive
filter that, for any fixed transmit filter HT , minimizes:
MSEE = E
[‖X−HREYE‖2] (40)
This corresponds to the Wiener filter given by (see e.g. [45]):
H∗RE = H
†
TH
†
E
(
I + HEHTH
†
TH
†
E
)−1
(41)
In turn, the MSE in the eavesdropper channel, upon substituting (41) in (40), is given by:
MSEE = tr
{(
I + H†EHEHTH
†
T
)−1}
(42)
Note that the expressions for the legitimate receive filter and for the MSE in the the main channel are
already given in (13) and (15).
B. Optimal Transmit Filters
We now consider the design of the optimal linear transmit filter. This, in view of (15) and (42),
corresponds to the solution of the optimization problem given by:
min
HT
tr
{(
H†TH
†
MHMHT
)−1}
(43)
subject to the secrecy constraint:
tr
{(
I + H†EHEHTH
†
T
)−1} ≥ γ (44)
and to the power constraint:
tr
{
HTH
†
T
}
≤ Pavg (45)
with HTH
†
T  0. Note that – due to the channel knowledge assumptions – the legitimate transmitter,
the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper can also all set up this optimization problem to compute the
transmit filter and receive filters via (13) and (41).
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It is also possible to reduce this optimization problem to a standard convex optimization problem, by
adopting the change of variables Z =
(
HTH
†
T
)−1
together with the Woodbury matrix identity [46].
Thus, the optimization problem reduces to:
min
Z
tr
{(
H†MHM
)−1
Z
}
(46)
subject to the constraints:
tr {I} − tr
{(
H†EHE
)(
Z +
(
H†EHE
))−1} ≥ γ (47)
tr
{
Z−1
} ≤ Pavg (48)
and Z  0. The solution follows from the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions given by:(
H†MHM
)−1 − ν [(Z + (H†EHE))−1 (H†EHE)(Z + (H†EHE))−1]− µZ−2 = 0 (49)
ν
{
tr {I} − tr
{(
H†EHE
)(
Z +
(
H†EHE
))−1}− γ} = 0, ν ≥ 0 (50)
µ
[
Pavg − tr
{
Z−1
}]
= 0, µ ≥ 0 (51)
and Z  0, tr {I}− tr
{(
H†EHE
)(
Z +
(
H†EHE
))−1} ≥ γ, tr {Z−1} ≤ Pavg, where ν ans µ are the
Lagrange multipliers associated with the secrecy and power constraints, respectively.
It is clear from the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions above that there are three operational regimes: i)
the scenario where the transmitter can use all the available power without violating the secrecy constraint,
so that the secrecy constraint is not active (ν = 0) and the power constraint is active (µ > 0); ii) the
scenario where both the secrecy and power constraints are active (ν > 0 and µ > 0); and iii) the scenario
where the transmitter cannot use all the available power without violating the secrecy constraint, so that
the secrecy constraint is active (ν > 0) and the power constraint is inactive (µ = 0). Note that this
situation differs from the previous scenario (with ZF filters at both receivers) where it was possible to
use all the power available without violating the secrecy constraint. The difference derives from the use
of a more powerful receive filter by the eavesdropper.
It is difficult to extract a characterization of the optimal filter design from the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
optimality conditions above in the general scenario, even though the problem is convex. Consequently,
we concentrate on scenarios i) and iii) only.
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1) Power constraint active / secrecy constraint inactive: This situation arises typically in a regime of
low available power, due to the fact that the power, injected into the channel, is not enough to meet or
violate the secrecy constraint.
The following Theorem, which stems directly from the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions
above, defines the form of the optimal transmit filter, in such a regime.
Theorem 2: Assume that the legitimate transmitter, the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper know
the exact channel matrices HM and HE . Assume also that the legitimate receiver uses a ZF filter whereas
the eavesdropper receiver uses the optimal linear Wiener filter. Then, an optimal transmit filter in the
scenario where the power constraint is active whilst the secrecy constrain is inactive is, without loss of
generality, given by:
H∗T = α
(
H†MHM
)− 1
4 (52)
where α =
√
Pavg
tr
{
(H†MHM)
− 1
2
} .
Note that the right multiplication of the transmit filter in (52) by any unitary matrix produces another
optimal filter.
Proof: This Theorem follows from the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions by using the fact that ν = 0,
so that we can rewrite (49) as follows:(
H†MHM
)−1 − µZ−2 = 0 (53)
Note that, as expected, this solution corresponds to the solution embodied in Theorem 1, when the
secrecy constraint is inactive.
2) Power constraint inactive / secrecy constraint active: This is a situation that typically arises in a
regime of high available power; in fact, the use of all the available power would immediately violate the
secrecy constraint.
The following Theorem, which also stems directly from the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions,
defines the form of the optimal transmit filter, in such a regime. In particular, we use the fact that there
exists a non-singular m×m matrix C that diagonalizes both H†MHM and H†EHE simultaneously [46],
i.e. C†H†EHEC = ΛE and C
†H†MHMC = ΛM , where ΛM and ΛE are m × m positive definite
diagonal matrices, with diagonal elements λMi , i = 1, 2, . . . ,m and λEi , i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, respectively.
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Theorem 3: Assume that the legitimate transmitter, the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper know
the exact channel matrices HM and HE . Assume also that the legitimate receiver uses a ZF filter whereas
the eavesdropper receiver uses the optimal linear Wiener filter. Then, an optimal transmit filter in the
scenario where the power constraint is inactive whilst the secrecy constrain is active is, without loss of
generality, given by:
H∗T = C
(
αΛ
1
2
MΛ
1
2
E −ΛE
)− 1
2
(54)
where α =
tr
{
Λ
1
2
EΛ
− 1
2
M
}
tr{I}−γ .
Note that the right multiplication of the transmit filter in (54) by any unitary matrix produces another
optimal filter.
Proof: This Theorem also follows from the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions by using the fact that
µ = 0, so that we can rewrite (49) as follows:(
H†MHM
)−1 − ν [(Z + (H†EHE))−1 (H†EHE)(Z + (H†EHE))−1] = 0 (55)
or equivalently:
Λ−1M − ν
[(
C†ZC + ΛE
)−1
ΛE
(
C†ZC + ΛE
)−1]
= 0 (56)
3) Interpretation: It is interesting to contrast the operational principle of the optimal transmit filter
design when the secrecy constraint is inactive (in Theorem 2) to that when the secrecy constraint is active
(in Theorem 3).
In the regime where the power constraint is active and the secrecy constraint is inactive, the optimal
transmit filter decomposes the MIMO main channel into a set of parallel channels using an orthonormal
transformation that does not affect the transmit power. The optimal transmit filter then weighs the
individual subchannels, such that the power constraint is met with equality. The optimal weights depend
only on the eigenvalues of the matrix H†MHM .
In the regime where the power constraint is inactive and the secrecy constraint is active, the optimal
transmit filter decomposes simultaneously the MIMO main channel and the MIMO eavesdropper channel
into a set of parallel channels using an in general non-orthonormal transformation. Note that, even though
such a transformation may affect the transmit power, this is not a concern in this regime. The optimal
transmit filter then weighs the individual subchannels further, such that the secrecy constraint is met with
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equality. Interestingly, the optimal weights now depend on the generalized eigenvalues of the matrices
H†MHM and H
†
EHE .
It is also interesting to contrast the transmit filter design when the eavesdropper employs a ZF filter
(in Theorem 1) to that when the eavesdropper employs a Wiener filter. In the ZF case, when the secrecy
constraint is active, the transmit filter uses an orthonormal transformation to decompose an equivalent
channel in view of the fact that the power constraint is always active. In the Wiener case, when the
secrecy constraint is active, the transmit filter uses a non-singular matrix to decompose simultaneously
both channels.
C. A Note on the Validity of the Operational Regimes
It is now relevant to establish conditions, which are a function of the system parameters, that identify
the exact regions of validity of the operational regimes unveiled in the previous subsection.
1) Power constraint active / secrecy constraint inactive: To identify the validity of this regime we
minimize the objective function in (43), subject to the power constraint in (45) only. Note that this
constitutes a relaxation of the original optimization problem so the solution of this new optimization
problem can never lead to a worse MSE than the solution of the original problem. In turn, this solution
is also a solution of the original optimization problem provided that it does not violate the secrecy
constraint.
It is easy to show that this regime is valid if, for a fixed set of system parameters, Pavg, γ, HM and
HE , the following condition holds:
tr {I} − tr
{
H†EHE
[(
H∗TH
∗†
T
)−1
+ H†EHE
]−1}
≥ γ (57)
where H∗T corresponds to the design embodied in Theorem 2 given by:
H∗T =
√√√√√ Pavg
tr
{(
H†MHM
)− 1
2
} (H†MHM)− 14 (58)
Note that (57) and (58) can be used to determine a threshold secrecy constraint, γmaxreg1 , below which
we operate under this regime, or equivalently, a threshold power constraint, PavgmaxR1 , below which we
operate under this same regime. The threshold secrecy constraint is given by:
γmaxreg1 = tr {I} − tr
H
†
EHE
 tr
{(
H†MHM
)− 1
2
}
Pavg
(
H†MHM
) 1
2
+ H†EHE

−1 (59)
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2) Power constraint inactive / secrecy constraint active: To identify the validity of this regime we now
minimize the objective function in (43), subject to the secrecy constraint in (44) only. This also constitutes
a relaxation of the original optimization problem so the solution of this new optimization problem can
never lead to a worse MSE than the solution of the original problem. Moreover, this solution is also a
solution of the original optimization problem provided that it does not violate the power constraint.
It is also straightforward to show that this regime is valid if, for a fixed set of system parameters,
Pavg, γ, HM and HE , the following condition holds:
tr
{
H∗TH
∗†
T
}
≤ Pavg (60)
where H∗T corresponds to the design embodied in Theorem 3, given by:
H∗T = C
 tr
{
Λ
1
2
EΛ
− 1
2
M
}
tr {I} − γ Λ
1
2
MΛ
1
2
E −ΛE

− 1
2
(61)
Similarly to the previous case, (60) and (61) can be used to determine a threshold secrecy constraint,
γminreg3 , above which we operate under this regime, or equivalently, a threshold power constraint,
PavgminR3 , above which we operate in the same regime. The threshold power constraint is given by:
PavgminR3 = tr
C
 tr
{
Λ
1
2
EΛ
− 1
2
M
}
tr {I} − γ Λ
1
2
MΛ
1
2
E −ΛE

−1
C†
 (62)
V. GENERALIZATIONS
It is also of interest to generalize the filter design problem to scenarios that involve some degree of
channel uncertainty. We consider two cases:
1) The legitimate receiver knows the exact state of the main channel and the statistics of the eaves-
dropper channel, the eavesdropper receiver knows the exact state of the eavesdropper channel and
the statistics of the main channel, and the transmitter knows only the statistics of the main and
eavesdropper channels;
2) The legitimate receiver knows the exact state of the main channel and the statistics of the eaves-
dropper channel, the eavesdropper receiver knows the exact state of the eavesdropper channel and
the statistics of the main channel, and the transmitter knows the exact state of both channels.
These scenarios arise naturally in the ”secure” video broadcasting model depicted in Figure 1, where
both receivers – even though they may have subscribed to different services – are active users of the
network: in case 1), it is assumed that the receivers convey information about the statistics of their own
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channels to the transmitter via a feedback path (this information is then relayed to the other receivers); in
case 2), it is assumed that the receivers convey information about the exact state of their own channels to
the transmitter also via a feedback path (this information is not relayed to the other receivers though)4.
In addition, these scenarios can also be used to capture some of the uncertainty about the state of the
eavesdropper channel leading to filter designs with considerable operational significance.
We also comment on more efficient mechanisms to use the available resources, due to the fact that
some of the solutions unveiled earlier have demonstrated that the transmitter does not always use all the
available power in order to meet the security constraints.
The ensuing formulations are based on the assumption that the so-called eavesdropper adopts a linear
receiver. Once again, the implications of the use, by the eavesdropper, of a non-linear rather than linear
estimator are also discussed in the Section VI.
A. Scenario 1
A possible formulation of the filter design problem when the receivers know the exact state of their own
channels and the distribution of the other channels, whereas the transmitter knows only the distribution
of the channels, is given by:
min
HT
MSEM = EHM ,HE {MSEM (HM ,HE)} (63)
subject to the security constraint:
MSEE = EHM ,HE {MSEE (HM ,HE)} ≥ γ (64)
and the total power constraint:
tr
{
HTH
†
T
}
≤ Pavg (65)
where MSEM is the expected value, with respect to HM and HE , of the MSE in the main channel
for fixed channel matrices HM and HE , i.e. MSEM (HM ,HE), and MSEE is the expected value, with
respect to HM and HE , of the MSE in the eavesdropper channel for fixed channel matrices HM and
HE , i.e. MSEE (HM ,HE).
By assuming that the legitimate receiver uses a ZF filter and the eavesdropper uses either a ZF filter
or a Wiener filter, then the optimization problem reduces to:
4Note that the transmitter may also be able to capture an estimate of the statistics of the channels or the state of the channels in time division
duplex (TDD) environments.
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min
HT
EHM
{
tr
{(
H†TH
†
MHMHT
)−1}}
(66)
subject to:
tr
{
HTH
†
T
}
≤ Pavg (67)
and:
EHE
{
tr
{(
H†TH
†
EHEHT
)−1}} ≥ γ (68)
or:
EHE
{
tr
{(
I + H†EHEHTH
†
T
)−1}} ≥ γ (69)
depending on whether it is assumed that the eavesdropper adopts a ZF or a Wiener filter, respectively.
The significance of this formulation relates to the fact that the legitimate transmitter, the legitimate
receiver and the eavesdropper receiver all have the necessary information to set up this optimization
problem in order to conceive the transmit filter and therefore the receive filters via (13) and (14) or (41),
respectively. In addition, as long as the legitimate transmitter and the legitimate receiver agree to use
this formulation to perform the legitimate transmit and receive filter designs, there is no incentive for the
eavesdropper to adopt any other formulation beyond this one to design its own filter.
In particular, assume that the legitimate transmitter and the legitimate receiver adopt the formulation
based on the use of a Wiener filter by the eavesdropper. If the eavesdropper adopted another linear filter,
the average value of the MSE of the eavesdropper channel would still be above γ in view of the optimality
of the Wiener filter.
In contrast, assume that the legitimate transmitter and the legitimate receiver adopt the formulation
based on the use of a ZF filter by the eavesdropper. In the regime of high available power, and once again
if the eavesdropper used another linear filter, then the average value of the MSE of the eavesdropper
channel would still be above γ in view of the fact that the performance of a ZF filter approaches that
of a Wiener filter in such a regime. In the regime of low available power, if the eavesdropper used a
Wiener filter instead, then the average value of the eavesdropper MSE could be evidently below γ. This
concern can be bypassed by operating at high enough available powers.
B. Scenario 2
A formulation of the filter design problem when the receivers know the exact state of their own channels
and the distribution of the other channels, where as the transmitter knows the exact state of the channels,
is given by:
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min
HT
MSEM (HM ,HE) (70)
subject to the security constraint:
MSEE = EHM ,HE {MSEE (HM ,HE)} ≥ γ (71)
and the total power constraint:
tr
{
HTH
†
T
}
≤ Pavg (72)
By assuming once again that the legitimate receiver uses a ZF filter and the eavesdropper uses either
a ZF filter or a Wiener filter, then the optimization problem reduces to:
min
HT
tr
{(
H†TH
†
MHMHT
)−1}
(73)
subject to:
tr
{
HTH
†
T
}
≤ Pavg (74)
and:
EHE
{
tr
{(
H†TH
†
EHEHT
)−1}} ≥ γ (75)
or:
EHE
{
tr
{(
I + H†EHEHTH
†
T
)−1}} ≥ γ (76)
depending on whether it is assumed that the eavesdropper adopts a ZF or a Wiener filter, respectively.
Note now that the legitimate transmitter and the legitimate receiver can also set up this optimization
problem in order to determine the transmit filter and therefore the legitimate receive filter via (13). In
contrast, the eavesdropper – in view of the absence of knowledge of the legitimate receiver channel
– cannot set up this optimization problem, so it is bound to use a mismatched filter. In view of the
previous rationale, as long as the eavesdropper uses a linear filter and independently of whether the
legitimate parties use the ZF or Wiener based formulation, we can thus argue that in the regime of high
available power the average value of the eavesdropper MSE is always above γ whereas in the regime of
low available power the average value of the eavesdropper MSE can in principle be below γ, e.g. in the
extremely unlikely event that the linear filter chosen (perhaps randomly) by the eavesdropper corresponds
to the Wiener filter, but the legitimate parties assume that the eavesdropper uses a ZF rather than a Wiener
filter in the design formulation.
Note also that this formulation does not explore the transmitter knowledge about the exact state of
the eavesdropper channel per se. It is not clear whether or not such knowledge can be exploited in an
operational meaningful way.
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C. Towards the solution of the new formulations
These problems appear to be difficult to solve in general in view of the expectation operations in (63)
– (64) in scenario 1 and in (71) in scenario 2. However, it is possible to conceive a solution for the
formulations that are based on the use of a ZF filter by the eavesdropper.
By adopting the change of variables Z =
(
HTH
†
T
)−1
the optimization problem in (63), (64) and (65)
reduces to:
min
Z
tr
{
EHM
{(
H†MHM
)−1}
Z
}
(77)
subject to:
tr
{
EHE
{(
H†EHE
)−1}
Z
}
≥ γ (78)
and:
tr
{
Z−1
} ≤ Pavg (79)
and HTH
†
T  0, whereas the optimization problem in (70), (71) and (72) reduces to:
min
Z
tr
{(
H†MHM
)−1
Z
}
(80)
subject to:
tr
{
EHE
{(
H†EHE
)−1}
Z
}
≥ γ (81)
and:
tr
{
Z−1
} ≤ Pavg (82)
The availability, when HM is such that its nM rows are independent CN (0,ΣM ) circularly sym-
metric complex Gaussian random vectors and when HE is such that its nE rows are also independent
CN (0,ΣE) circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random vectors, of closed form expressions for
E
{(
H†MHM
)−1}
and E
{(
H†EHE
)−1}
, which are given by [47]:
EHM
{(
H†MHM
)−1}
=
1
nM −m− 1Σ
−1
M , for nM −m− 1 > 0 (83)
and
EHE
{(
H†EHE
)−1}
=
1
nE −m− 1Σ
−1
E , for nE −m− 1 > 0 (84)
enable us to solve the optimization problem using the previous techniques [47].
The availability of closed for expressions for EHM
{(
H†MHM
)−1}
and EHE
{(
H†EHE
)−1}
when
HM and HE follow more general distributions would allow us to solve the optimization problem in other
scenarios too.
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D. A discussion about effective use of resources
Another relevant aspect relates to the fact that some of the filter designs are such that the transmitter
does not use the entire available power budget in order to meet the secrecy constraint (see Section IV).
One could thus argue that there is not an effective use of the available resources.
There are various possible generalizations to address this issue:
1) Enter artificial noise: Artificial noise is an effective approach to provide some degree of distortion
at the eavesdropper ( [19], [20], [21] and [22]), so it is interesting to reflect whether it might be possible
to integrate elements of the filter design approach with elements of the artificial noise paradigm whereby
the fraction of the unused power is also explored to further jam the eavesdropper.
In general, it is not possible to integrate directly the artificial noise approach with our filter design
approach because the transmitter does not signal over the null space of the main channel.
However, it is possible to conceive more elaborate scenarios that involve the use of an additional friendly
jammer that shares the available power budget with the transmitter. This jammer is also constrained to
convey artificial noise over the null space of the MIMO channel that links the jammer to the legitimate
receiver.
The action of the jammer – which adds additional noise to the eavesdropper channel – translates
into a new eavesdropper channel between the transmitter and the eavesdropper receiver incorporating
the effect of the artificial noise, that replaces the original eavesdropper channel. Therefore, one can
pose immediately an optimization problem akin to the previous filter design with secrecy constraints
optimization problems that – in addition to involve the design of the transmit filter – also involves the
determination of the fraction of power to be used by the legitimate transmitter and the fraction of power
to be used by the friendly jammer subject to the available power budget. The determination of the solution
of this optimization problem entails the extra level of complexity associated with how to share the power
budget though.
2) Enter the time and frequency dimension: Another approach that points towards a more efficient
use of the resource relates to scenarios where one leverages the variability of the channel in the time
domain (as in MIMO wireless channels) or in the frequency domain (as in MIMO-OFDM channels) in
conjunction with available power constraints that operate along the multiple dimensions, i.e. long-term
– rather than short-term – power constraints (e.g. [48], [49] and [50]). As an example, by assuming that
all the parties know the state of the various time and/or frequency channels, it is possible to put forth
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the optimization problems:
min
HT (i), i=1,··· ,n
1
n
n∑
i=1
MSEM (HM (i),HE(i)) (85)
subject to:
1
n
n∑
i=1
MSEE (HM (i),HE(i)) ≥ γ (86)
and:
tr
{
HT (i)HT (i)
†
}
≤ Pavg, i = 1, · · · , n (87)
assuming a short-term power constraint, or:
1
n
n∑
i=1
tr
{
HT (i)HT (i)
†
}
≤ Pavg (88)
assuming a long-term power constraint, where HT (i) is the transmit filter at time/frequency i and
HM (i) and HE(i) contain the gains from each main and eavesdropper channel input to each main
and eavesdropper channel output, respectively, at time/frequency i.
The use of the long-term power constraint – instead of the short-term one – now offers the means to
distribute the available power more efficiently over the time or frequency dimensions in order to obtain
a better performance. Note that the short-term power constraint filter design problem can leverage the
previous techniques (see Sections III and IV); on the other hand, the long-term power constraint problem
may require more sophisticated techniques.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We now present a set of numerical results in order to provide further insight into the problem of
filter design with secrecy constraints. In particular, we present the performance of the filter designs in
the presence of perfect and imperfect channel knowledge, as well as in the presence of eavesdroppers
that adopt non-linear rather than linear estimation. We also present the impact of the filter designs on
other relevant metrics, that include the error probability and achievable secrecy rates. We consider for
simplicity a 2×2 MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel where the main channel and the eavesdropper channel
matrices are, respectively, given by:
HM =
4 −1
1 2
 , HE =
2 −1
1 1

This constitutes a degraded scenario because H†MHM  H†EHE , therefore, in general the MSE in the
eavesdropper channel will be higher than the one in the main channel.
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A. Performance of the Filter Designs in the Presence of Perfect Channel Knowledge
We first consider the scenario where the channels are known perfectly by all the nodes – as assumed
in Theorems 1, 2 and 3 – in order to test the performance of our designs. Figure 3 depicts the MSEs
in the main and in the eavesdropper channels and the input power to the channels vs. the secrecy
constraint for Pavg = 1 when ZF filters are used at both the receivers. The solution clearly depicts the
two operational regimes unveiled in Theorem 1: i) the regime where the power constraint is active but the
security constraint is inactive (for smaller values of γ); and ii) the regime where the power and security
constraints are active and met with equality (for larger values of γ). Figure 3 also depicts the MSEs in
the main and in the eavesdropper channels and the input power to the channels vs. the secrecy constraint
for Pavg = 1 when the optimal linear Wiener filters are used at both receivers, in order to provide further
insight.5 Surprisingly, in the relevant regime of large γ, the use of ZF filters rather than Wiener filters
leads to a better MSE in the main channel without the violation of the security constraint. This is due
to the fact that – via the use of ZF filters in lieu of the Wiener ones – the transmitter can use all of the
available power in such a scenario, in order to drive the MSE to a lower value.
Figure 4 now shows the values of the MSEs in the main and in the eavesdropper channels and the
injected power into the channels vs. the secrecy constraint for Pavg = 1, when the eavesdropper uses the
optimal linear filter instead. The solution exhibits the three operational regimes characterized in Section
IV-B. Below γmaxreg1 , the optimal transmit filter, which is given by Theorem 2, minimizes the MSE in
the main channel subject to the power constraint only. We can indeed verify that the available power
is not sufficient to meet or violate the secrecy constraint. In-between γmaxreg1 and γminreg3 ,the transmit
filter6 minimizes the MSE in the main channel while meeting the power and the secrecy constraint with
equality. Above γminreg3 , the optimal transmit filter, which is given by Theorem 3, minimizes the MSE
in the main channel subject to the secrecy constraint only. Note that it is not possible to use all the
available power, otherwise the secrecy constraint would be violated. This power restriction results in a
much higher MSE in the main channel than in the eavesdropper channel for large values of γ because
as the injected power tends to zero the MSE that results from the ZF receiver grows very rapidly.
Finally, in view of the fact that we have motivated the filter design problem with secrecy constraints
problems in scenarios where a provider seeks to guarantee that users that have subscribed to a service
5To the best of our knowledge, the problem of filter design with secrecy constraints when Wiener filters are used at both receivers is not a
convex in general. Therefore, an approximate solution has been determined through numerical methods.
6The solution in this regime, which has not been derived, was obtained through numerical methods.
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have a reasonable quality of service, whereas users that did not do not experience such quality of service,
it is relevant to understand whether or not there are circumstances where the MSE in the main channel
can in fact be higher than the MSE in the eavesdropper channel.
In the presence of channel degradedness the main channel MSE can be higher than the eavesdropper
channel MSE for low available power Pavg for a fixed target γ when the legitimate receiver uses a ZF
filter and the eavesdropper receiver uses the Wiener filter. However, with the increase in the available
power the performance of the ZF filter approaches that of the Wiener filter, so that – in view of channel
degradedness - the main channel MSE eventually becomes lower than the eavesdropper channel MSE.
In contrast, in the absence of channel degradedness the main channel MSE can be higher than the
eavesdropper channel MSE when both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper receiver use ZF filters
or when the legitimate receiver uses a ZF filter and the eavesdropper receiver uses the Wiener one. This
aspect is highlighted for a scenario where HM =
[
4 −1
1 2
]
and HE =
[
3.5 −1
1 3
]
in Figure 5 – note that
MSE of the eavesdropper obeys the secrecy constraint though.
However, with the emergence of MIMO-OFDM systems in a variety of wireless standards, it is possible
conceive approaches that bypass the absence of degradedness. For example, one can in principle select
sets of sub-carriers whose MIMO channels obey the degradedness property in order to assure that the
MSE in the main channel is significantly lower than the MSE in the eavesdropper channel.
B. Performance of the Filter Designs in the Presence of Imperfect Channel Knowledge
We now consider the scenario where the channels are only known imperfectly by the nodes in order
to test the robustness of the designs embodied in Theorems 1, 2 and 3. In particular, we assume that the
nodes have only access to an estimate of the main channel H˜M = HM +ΦM , where HM represents the
true main channel matrix and ΦM models the main channel estimation error (with i.i.d. elements that
follow a Gaussian distribution with mean zero and variance σ2M ), as well as access to an estimate of the
eavesdropper channel H˜E = HE +ΦE , where HE represents the true eavesdropper channel matrix and
ΦE models the eavesdropper channel estimation error (also with i.i.d. elements that follow a Gaussian
distribution with mean zero and variance σ2E). We also assume, for simplicity, that all the nodes have
access to exactly the same estimates of the main and eavesdropper channel. The transmit and receive
filters are designed based on the estimate of the channels rather than the true channels, via Theorems 1,
2 and 3.
Figures 6 and 7 depict the MSEs in the main and eavesdropper channels (averaged over 2000 realiza-
tions of the matrices that model the channel estimation errors) vs. the secrecy constraint for Pavg=1, for
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the scenario where the legitimate and eavesdropper receivers use ZF filters and the scenario where the
legitimate receiver uses a ZF filter but the eavesdropper uses a Wiener filter, respectively.
We observe that channel modelling errors have an impact on the MSE of the main channel and – of
particular relevance – on the MSE of the eavesdropper channel. The higher the deviation of the channel
estimate from the true channel, which is modelled by the variances σ2M and σ
2
E , the higher the deviation
of the new MSEs from the original ones.
However, we also observe that the filter designs exhibit a certain degree of robustness. In the scenario
where the eavesdropper uses the Wiener filter, the corresponding MSE appears to be reasonably robust
to the channel modelling errors. In contrast, in the scenario where the eavesdropper uses a ZF filter, the
corresponding MSE is more sensitive to the channel modelling errors.
In general, for low to moderate channel estimation errors, the filter designs still guarantee that the
secrecy constraint is not violated for a reasonable large set of γ.
C. Linear vs. Nonlinear Estimation
It is also relevant to consider the situation where the eavesdropper is not restricted to choose a linear
filter. One could in principle argue that the eavesdropper (even if another user of a network as in Figure 1)
could use the optimal nonlinear receive filter, instead of the optimal linear one, to process the information
in order to derive a lower MSE. This involves using a conditional mean estimator (CME), that delivers
the estimate given by:
XˆE = E {X | YE} =∫
x PX (X = x) PYE |X (YE | X = x) dx∫
PX (X = x) PYE |X (YE | X = x) dx
(89)
where PX (X) is the probability density function of the input and PYE |X (YE | X) is the conditional
probability density function of the eavesdropper receive vector YE given the input vector X.
We thus assess the performance penalty incurred by the use of a conditional mean estimator by the
eavesdropper, but the transmitter designs its filter based on the assumption that the eavesdropper uses the
optimal linear filter. We study scenarios where the elements of the input vector X are either BPSK or
16-PAM. Figure 8 shows the values of the MSEs in the main and in the eavesdropper channels and the
injected power into the channels vs. the secrecy constraint for Pavg = 1. We can observe that designing
the transmit filters based on the assumption that the eavesdropper is using an optimal linear receive
filter results, as expected, in a lower eavesdropper MSE, when the input is not Gaussian (note that for
Gaussian signals the conditional mean estimator is, in fact, linear). However, and interestingly, in regimes
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of greatest operational interest of large γ, the penalty that we pay by assuming that the eavesdropper uses
an optimal linear filter rather than the optimal non-linear one vanishes, so that the eavesdropper does not
have any real advantage in using the considerably more complex conditional mean estimator. This is due
to the fact that the power injected in the channel approaches zero as the values of γ increases, in order
to meet the secrecy constraint.
D. Impact of the Filter Designs on Other Metrics
It is also of interest to assess the impact of the filter designs on other metrics of operational relevance,
including the Bit Error Rate (BER) in the main and eavesdropper channels as well as achievable secrecy
rates.
Figure 9 and 10 depict the Bit Error Rates (BER) of the main and the eavesdropper channels for the
scenarios where i) ZF filters are used at both receivers and ii) a ZF receiver is used at the legitimate
receiver and a Wiener filter is used at the eavesdropper receiver, respectively. These BER results are
obtained through Monte Carlo simulations, assuming that the transmitter uses BPSK modulation and that
the receiver uses a simple slicer to detect the information at the filters output. We can observe that by
imposing a constraint on the MSE of the eavesdropper we also restrict the BER of the eavesdropper to be
above a certain threshold. The resulting BER in the main channel, though, is also slightly degraded due
to the secrecy restriction. We can also observe that the BERs that we can achieve when both receivers
use ZF filters are lower than those when the legitimate receiver uses a ZF filter and the eavesdropper
uses a Wiener filter (cf. Figures 9 and 10). We argue that this seemingly counterintuitive behavior is due
to the fact that in the scenario where the eavesdropper uses a Wiener filter instead of the ZF one, the
transmitter cannot use all the available power.
Finally, Figure 11 compares the achievable secrecy rates yielded by our filter designs to the secrecy
capacity of the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel, which is given in [15]. It is clear that the filter designs
result in a loss of secrecy rate, which is more pronounced at high than at low available power levels,
both for scenarios where the eavesdropper uses a ZF filter as well as scenarios where the eavesdropper
uses a Wiener filter.
However, we note that our designs can be immediately realized in practice in order to impair the
eavesdropper. In contrast, practical secrecy capacity achieving codes, which are known only for some
special channels, have to be developed in order to achieve the secrecy capacity of the MIMO Gaussian
wiretap channel.
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VII. CONCLUSION
We have considered the problem of filter design with secrecy constraints in the classical wiretap
scenario, where the objective is to conceive, subject to a power constraint, transmit and receive filters
that minimize the MSE between the legitimate parties whilst guaranteeing that the eavesdropper MSE
remains above a certain threshold.
In particular, we have provided characterizations of the form of the receive and transmit filters for
MIMO Gaussian channels, considering the situation where both receivers use Zero-Forcing filters or the
eavesdropper uses a Wiener filter. We have also provided efficient computational procedures to design
the optimal transmit and receive filters.
In particular, we have shown that the transmit filter designs are resilient to channel modeling errors as
well as to the use of more powerful nonlinear receive filters, rather than the optimal linear Wiener filter,
by the eavesdropper. We have also shown that the designs limit not only the eavesdropper MSE but also
the error probability.
We have also provided a framework to generalize this filter design problem from the scenario where
all parties are assumed to know the exact state of the channel to scenarios where there is some channel
uncertainty. This generalization is applicable not only to wireless systems subject to various channel state
information regimes as well as to systems where there is uncertainty about the state of the eavesdropper
channel. The generalization of the designs to cases where both receivers use optimal linear Wiener filters
appear to be open in general.
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Figure 1. A possible application scenario of the problem of filter design with secrecy constraints: ”Secure” video broadcasting.
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Figure 2. MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel model.
34
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
 
 
γ
M
SE
 / 
Po
we
r
MSEM (Wiener Filters)
MSEE (Wiener Filters)
Pin  (Wiener Filters)
MSEM (ZF Filters)
MSEE (ZF Filters)
Pin  (ZF Filters)
Figure 3. Main and eavesdropper channel MSEs vs. secrecy constraint and input power vs. secrecy constraint, for the optimal
transmit filter design and either ZF filters at both receivers or Wiener filters at both the receivers (Pavg = 1).
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Figure 4. Main and eavesdropper channel MSEs vs. secrecy constraint and input power vs. secrecy constraint, for the optimal
transmit filter design with a ZF filter at the legitimate receiver and a Wiener filter at the eavesdropper receiver (Pavg = 1).
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Figure 5. Main and eavesdropper channel MSEs vs. secrecy constraint, for the optimal transmit filter design with ZF filters at
both receivers and Wiener filters at the eavesdropper receiver, in a non-degraded scenario (Pavg = 1).
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Figure 6. Main and eavesdropper channel average MSEs vs. secrecy constraint, in the presence of channel error estimation,
for the optimal transmit filter design with ZF filter at both receivers (Pavg = 1).
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Figure 7. Main and eavesdropper channel average MSEs vs. secrecy constraint, in the presence of channel error estimation,
for the optimal transmit filter design with a ZF filter at the legitimate receiver and a Wiener filter at the eavesdropper receiver
(Pavg = 1).
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Figure 8. Main and eavesdropper channel MSEs vs. secrecy constraint and input power vs. secrecy constraint, for the transmit
filter design based on the use of a ZF filter at the legitimate receiver and a Wiener filter at the eavesdropper (Pavg = 1).
MSEE(Wiener) corresponds to the eavesdropper MSE associated with the linear Wiener filter. MSEE(CME− BPSK) cor-
responds to the eavesdropper MSE associated with the CME for BPSK inputs. MSEE(CME− 16PAM) corresponds to the
eavesdropper MSE associated with the CME for 16PAM inputs.
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Figure 9. Bit error rate vs. available power for the scenario where both receivers use ZF filters (γ = 0.5).
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Figure 10. Bit error rate vs. available power for the scenario where the legitimate receiver uses a ZF filter and the eavesdropper
receiver uses the optimal linear filter (γ = 0.5).
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Figure 11. Secrecy capacity of the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel vs. available power and achievable secrecy rate vs. available
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